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There is an increasing requirement from high levels
within the Government that the Navy's aircraft cost
estimators and analysts provide explicit estimates for the
sub-elements of Aircraft System Test and Evaluation (AST&E)
efforts. The data required to produce more accurate and
detailed estimates represent lower levels in the Aircraft
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) than previously available.
This is a two volume thesis. Volume I examines the WBS and
Contractor Cost Data Reporting (CCDR) system with a
description of current reporting practices and implement-
ation shortcomings. Recommended courses of action to
improve reporting requirements and thereby improve data
quality and cost estimates are proposed. Major cost drivers
for AST&E, from both the perspective of Defense Contractors
and Military Flight Test Centers, are discussed. Beginning
in Volume II, a relational data base system is introduced to
more easily evaluate AST&E cost elements and physical/
performance characteristics. A Contractor Flight Test cost
estimating relationship (CER) is developed through step-wise
multiple regression analysis of data gathered from Defense
Contractors and Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR)
.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. PURPOSE OF PROJECT
There is an increasing requirement from high levels
within the Government that the Navy's aircraft cost es-
timators and analysts provide explicit estimates for the
sub-elements of aircraft system test and evaluation efforts.
These requests ask for additional data, which represent
lower levels in the Aircraft Work Breakdown Structure (WBS)
than previously required, and the methods necessary to
produce them are needed in order to estimate Aircraft System
Test and Evaluation costs in greater detail and with better
accuracy than is currently feasible.
The ultimate objective of the Naval Air Systems Command
(NAVAIR) is to develop cost estimating relationships for all
of the following System Test and Evaluation elements:
1. Wind Tunnel Article and Test
2. Static Article and Test
3. Fatigue Article and Test
4. Drop Article and Test
5. Contractor Flight Tests
6. Flight Test Instrumentation
7. Miscellaneous Ground Tests
8
.
Support of Contractor Flight Tests
9. Navy Technical Evaluation
10. Operational Evaluation
11. Contractor Support of Navy Test.
The necessary tasks to attain this objective are to:
1. Identify physical, performance, and programmatic
parameters which are the primary drivers of each of
the major functional cost categories (engineering
labor, manufacturing labor, quality control labor, and
tooling labor) for each of the major elements of
Aircraft System Test and Evaluation
2. Develop parametric cost estimation relationships for
each of the above System Test and Evaluation elements
and each appropriate functional cost category by:
a. Defining a sample of pertinent aircraft
programs
b. Formulating a work breakdown structure/
functional cost element matrix
c. Acquiring historical cost data
d. Organizing the data for analysis
e. Employing statistical methods to develop cost
estimation relationships, and
f. Documenting data, sources, rationale, and
methodology.
Given the time constraints, attempting to concentrate
on all eleven elements simultaneously would prove to be both
unmanageable and inefficient. Therefore, the project
sponsor has directed that the initial research focus on the
area of Contractor Test Flights. If conditions permit. Wind




B. IMPORTANCE OF THIS STUDY
The importance of this study is justified by the
following reasons. First, due to the rapidly increasing
cost of new aircraft systems in a budgetarily constrained
environment, the accuracy of cost analysis performed by
NAVAIR becomes imperative. Second, an integral study of the
cost problem would provide more insight to NAVAIR to answer
the ever increasing informational needs that originate as
high as Congressional Budget Committees and Executive Branch
Agencies. More important, it is crucial for cost analysts
to take into consideration new cost drivers, particularly in
the area of avionics. Also, it is felt that better coor-
dination with contractors via an improved implementation of
the Contractor Cost Data Reporting (CCDR) system, WBS
format, and cost estimation model will result in the
standardization of reporting procedures across the industry
and will increase the likelihood of contractor delivery of
guaranteed performances for allocated funds.
C. ORGANIZATION OF THIS STUDY
This is a two volume research study. Volume I is
organized as follows: Chapter II provides an overview of
the Contractor Cost Data Reporting (CCDR) system and the
Military Standard Work Breakdown Structure (WBS). A
critical analysis of the current cost estimation system and
its shortcomings is the focus of Chapter III. It proposes a
11
set of feasible courses of action that could be implemented
to improve the present system. Chapter IV outlines the
various steps taken to accomplish the proposed research.
Specifically, a three-step approach is undertaken:
exploration, analysis, and refinement. Such a study helps
identify research processes and keys upon which this study
should concentrate. These issues are analyzed in detail in
Chapter V. Results obtained from an extensive survey of
experts in the contractors' System Test and Evaluation field
are reported. In particular, major cost drivers that are
frequently identified include aircraft weight, speed,
avionics, software, and management practices and policies.
Volume II focuses on the analysis of data discussed in
Volume I, Chapter I describes the available current data
and its structure. Current parametric techniques are
surveyed in Chapter II. A requirements analysis, design,
and development of a data base management system called
TIGER is performed in Chapter III. The purpose of the data
base is threefold. First, it provides immediate and
precise answers to ad hoc queries that cost analysts could
pose. Second, it outlines a well-structured basis for
standardizing the accounting process handled by various
contractors. Third, it can be used to assist statistical
analysis for cost estimation. The data collected is
analyzed, discussed and cost driver models are developed and
12
presented in Chapter IV. Finally, conclusions derived as a
result of this study are discussed in Chapter V.
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II. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS
FOR CONTRACTOR COST DATA REPORTING
A. THE CONTRACTOR COST DATA REPORTING (CCDR) SYSTEM
1. Introduction to CCDR
During the decision proce.ss on any major defense
acquisition, the primary focus is on the development and
attainment of performance objectives. An accurate acquisi-
tion cost estimate is an equally significant program
parameter that must be considered in detail during this
decision process. Standardized, accurate and detailed cost
data are indispensible to analysts required to develop
reliable cost estimates.
In July 1970, the Defense Blue Ribbon Panel Report
stated, "the extent of availability of such (cost) data in
usable form is a limiting factor on the potential accuracy
of cost predictions." ( NAVMAT P-5241, 1973, p. i) The
Contractor Cost Data Reporting (CCDR) system was established
by the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 1973 to provide
for "continual improvement in the ability of the Department
of Defense (DOD) to develop and use valid cost estimates".
(NAVMAT P-5241, 1973, p. i) This system is intended to
provide decision makers with a means by which contract costs
and other related data can be collected to aid in
14
acquisition management. The reporting requirements are
designed to collect data on defense weapon systems utilizing
standard data definitions and reporting structures which
facilitate integration with other defense management
systems. To provide a common ground from which to view this
research, the following excerpts from the Contractor Cost
Data Reporting (CCDR) System ( NAVMAT P-5241), and the
Military Standard Work Breakdown Structures for Defense
Materiel Items (MIL-STD-881A) are included in this study.
2 . Purposes of the CCDR System
The data collected from the Defense Contractors is
intended to be used by DOD components in establishing cost
estimating, programming, budgeting and procurement respon-
sibilities. This data collection effort is to provide a
common data base and assist the Department of Defense in the
following areas:
a. Preparing estimates in support of the Five Year
Defense Program
b. Developing independent government cost estimates in
support of cost and price analyses and contract
negotiations
c. Evaluating contractors' proposals
d. Responding to requirements for summary information to
the Secretary of Defense concerning selected
acquisitions to reflect a comparison of current
estimates, original plans, and current approved
program costs and
e. Preparing cost estimates for major system review by
the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC)




Reporting requirements are differentiated in
accordance with the following contract categories:
a. Category I—Major contracts for Prototypes in Advanced
Development, Full Scale Development, and Production,
within programs which are estimated in the Five Year
Defense Program to require a cumlative financing for
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation in excess
of $200 million or a total procurement investment in
excess of $1 billion
b. Category II—Contracts for defense materiel items not
satisfying the Category I criteria but selected by the
DOD component for cost data reporting because of
complexity, criticality, future procurement plans and
contract value. (NAVMAT P-5241, 1973, p. 1-2)
The data elements which produce the common data base
are generated by four reports
:
1. Cost Data Summary Report DD Form 1921
2. Functional Cost-Hour Report DD Form 19 21-1
3. Progress Curve Report DD Form 1921-2
4. Plant-Wide Data Report DD Form 1921-3
These standardized reports are designed to satisfy a wide
range of weapon system acquisitions. The following excerpts
from NAVMAT P-5241 provide a basic description of these four
CCDR system reports which are submitted at varying frequen-
cies as negotiated in the contract:
a. DD Form 19 21—Cost Data Summary Report
(Figure 2-1)
Primarily designed for Category I contracts, the
Cost Data Summary Report summarizes all activities included
in the contract and aggregates cost against the reporting
16
elements selected from the work breakdown structures defined
in MIL-STD-881 and specified in the contract. WBS elements
below Level 3 of MIL-STD-881 may be designated for CCDR but
should be limited to those for which cost data can be
realistically utilized. The Cost Data Summary Report is
also used to present the contractor ' s program estimate for
RFP • s r program reviews, or special studies in accordance
with the fiscal years and quantities specified by the DOD
component for the total program. (NAVMAT P-5241, 1973, p. 3-
3)
b. DD Form 1921-1—Functional Cost-Hour Report
(Figure 2-2)
The Functional Cost-Hour Report is the means of
identifying and collecting comparable functional costs,
e.g., engieering, tooling, manufacturing, for (1) specific
contracts and (2) estimates for the fiscal years and
quantities specified by the DOD component for the total
program. Reports may be required for recurring, non-recurr-
ing, and total costs, as determined and specified by the DOD
contracting component. (NAVMAT P-5241, 1973, p. 3-9)
c. DD Form 1921-2—Progress Curve Report
(Figure 2-3)
The Progress Curve Report provides a unit or an
average unit cost of the unit or lot accepted during the
report period. All costs reported on this form are recurr-
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d. DD Form 1921-3—Plant Wide Data Report
(Figure 2-4) *
The report shall be prepared based on the
contractor's accounting system and the estimating procedure.
The reporting dates should be established to coincide with
the contractor's fiscal year. It will be submitted for
Category I contracts only. This report is a standardized
plant-wide overhead report which replaces the various types
of overhead analyses now provided to Administrative Con-
tracting Officers (ACOs) for major acquisition. (NAVMAT P-
5241, 1973, p. 3-24)
The Contractor Cost Data Reporting system
pamphlet, NAVMAT P-5241, explains how to complete these
forms and lists definitions of cost data elements to include
engineering, tooling, quality control and manufacturing.
4 . Reporting Elements
The reporting elements required for data collection
are included in the Request for Proposal and/or the initial
contract. The level of detail to be included in the
contractor cost reports will be limited to that which can be
realistically generated by the contractor and utilized by
the appropriate DOD contracting component.
Reporting .elements for Category I contracts are
selected from the Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) as defined
in Military Standard—Work Breakdown Structures for Defense
Materiel Items (MIL-STD 881). Reporting elements for
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whenever possible or other criteria most readily reported by
the contractor using their existing management and account-
ing systems.
5. Direct Labor Hour Definitions
a. Engineering Direct Labor Hours
The hours expended in the study, analysis,
design, development , evaluation, and redesign of the
specified reporting element. Includes the prepara-
tion of specifications, drawings, parts lists,
wiring diagrams, technical coordination between
engineering and manufacturing, vendor coordination,
test planning and scheduling, analysis of test
results, data reduction, and report preparation.
This also includes the determination and
specification of requirements for reliability,
maintainability and quality control. (NAVMAT P-
5241, 1973, p. 4-1)
b. Tooling Direct Labor Hours
The hours expended in the planning, design,
fabrication, assembly, installation, modification,
maintenance and rework of all tools, including
assembly tools, dies, jigs, fixtures, master forms,
gauges, handling equipment, load bars, work
platforms (including installation of utilities
thereon), and test equipment (such as checkers and
analyzers in support of manufacturing the specified
reporting element). This entry includes hours
expended in the determination of tool requirements,
planning of fabrication and assembly operations,
maintaining tool records, establishing make-or-buy
plans and manufacturing plans on components and
equipment, scheduling and controlling all tool
orders, and programming and preparation of
templates and patterns, and form block manufacture.
(NAVMAT P-5241, 1973, p. 4-2)
c. Quality Control Direct Labor Hours
The hours expended in the design and
implementation of the necessary controls to ensure
that a manufacturing process produces an item or
product meeting prescribed standards. Includes
such tasks as receiving inspection, in-process and
26
final inspection of tools, parts, subassemblies
and complete assemblies, and reliability testing
and failure report reviewing; also included are
such tasks as the establishment of acceptable
quality level (AQL) and statistical methods for
determining performance of manufacturing processes.
The preparation of reports relating to these tasks
are to be considered quality control effort.
(NAVMAT P-5241, 1973, p. 4-2)
d. Manufacturing Direct Labor Hours
The hours expended on or chargeable to such
operations as production scheduling and expediting,
fabrication, processing, subassembly, final
assembly, reworking, modification, experimental
production, and installation of parts and
equipment, power plants, boosters, electronic
equipment, explosives, and other ordnance items
(including government furnished equipment) and the
proving of such equipment, instruments, etc., for
the specified reporting element. This includes the
construction of detail parts from raw materials. It
includes hours expended in the cutting, forming,
stretching and blanking operations performed on
material of any kind (metal, wood, plastic, glass,
cloth, tubing, etc.) to make individual parts. It
includes bench assemblies of all detail parts, all
minor and major assemblies, mating or jointing of
primary sections, installation of special and
general equipment, instruments and accessories
performed after the mating and all other
preparation and/or processing including all
flashing operations, annealing, heat treating,
baking, refrigeration, anodizing plating, painting
and dope operations and preflight and production
service operations, etc. (NAVMAT P-5241, 1973, p.
4-3)
6. Dollar Values
The CCDR system provides for the reporting of
various categories of contractor costs, e.g.. Direct Labor
Dollars, Overhead, Material, and Other Direct Charges.
However, because of the fact that all of the data for
this research would be historical, coupled with the lack of
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constant dollar data due to inflation, it would be statisti-
cally more significant to use Direct Labor Hours as the only
cost data element in this project.
B. WORK BREAKDOWN STRUCTURE
1 . Definition
A Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) is a product-
oriented family tree composed of hardware, services, and
data which result from project engineering efforts during
the development and production of a defense materiel item
and which completely defines the pro ject/program. A WBS
displays and defines the product ( s ) to be developed or
produced and relates the elements to work to be accomplished
to each other and to the end product. (MIL-STD-881A, 1975,
p. 2)
When a weapons system is viewed as a whole, the
importance of standardized reporting elements is reduced.
The Level 1 total system hours/cost will remain the same
regardless of what specific indentured sub-element they are
reported against. However, as individual reporting elements
are examined at each level of the Work Breakdown Structure
the need for these standardized definitions is imperative.
A lack of standardization will result in inconsistent data,
and in turn, unreliable cost estimates.
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2. Purposes of the Work Breakdown Structure MIL-STD
881A
As stated in the MIL-STD-881A, the purpose of the
WBS is to establish criteria governing the preparation and
employment of work breakdown structures for use during the
acquisition of designated defense materiel items. These
work breakdown structures would provide a consistent and
visible framework that facilitates:
a. A more effective management and technical base for
planning and assigning management and technical
responsibilities by operations within the government
offices responsible for the acquisition of defense
materiel items and those contractors furnishing the
items
b. More consistent control over and reporting of the
progress and status of engineering and other
contractor efforts, resource allocations/ cost
estimates, expenditures, and procurement actions
throughout the acquisition of defense materiel items
c. Consideration of total life cycle effects, including
development, production, activation, operational use,
and phase-out, when making system development and
acquisition decisions.
The uniformity in definition and approach for
developing the upper three levels of the WBS established by
this standard is expected to assure compatibility of
multiple-data requirements. The benefits expected from
increased uniformity in the generation of work breakdown
structures and their application to management practices
will be realized by the improved interpretation and recon-
ciliation of all reports prepared to this uniform framework
throughout acquisition of a defense materiel item. (MIL-STD-
881A, 1975, p. ii)
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3. Additional Work Breakdown Structure Definitions
a. Sununary Work Breakdown Structure (Summary WBS)
A Summary Work Breakdown Structure consists of the
upper three levels of a WBS prescribed by the standard and
having uniform element terminology, definition, and
placement in the family-tree structure. The upper three
levels of a summary WBS have been organized within the









7. Surface Vehicle Systems. (MIL-STD-881A, 1975, p. 2)
The three levels specified are defined as
follows:
1. Level 1 is the entire defense materiel item; for
example, the Minuteman ICBM System, the LHA Ship
System, or the M 109A1 Self-Propelled Howitzer System.
Usually, Level 1 is directly identified in the DOD
programming/budget system either as an integral
program element or as a project within an aggregated
program element
2. Level 2 elements are major elements of the defense
materiel item; for example, a ship, an air vehicle, a
tracked vehicle, or aggregations of services, (e.g.,
systems test and evaluation); and data
3. Level 3 elements are those subordinate to Level 2; for
example, an electric plant, an airframe, the power
package/drive train, or type of service, (e.g.,
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development test and evaluation); or item of data
(e.g., technical publications).
b. Project Summary Work Breakdown Structure
(Project Summary WBS
)
Project Summary WBS is a Summary WBS tailored to
a specific defense materiel item.
c. Contract Work Breakdown Structure (Contract WBS)
A Contract WBS is defined as the complete WBS
for a contract, developed and used by a contractor in
accordance with this standard and the contract work
statement.
d. Project Work Breakdown Structure (Project WBS)
A Project WBS is defined as the complete WBS for
the project, containing all WBS elements, related to the
developments and/or production of the defense materiel item.
e. Work Breakdown Structure Element
A work breakdown structure element is a discrete
portion of a work breakdown structure. A WBS element may be
either an identifiable item of hardware, set of data, or a
service. (MIL-STD-881A, 1975, p. 3)
C. SUMMARY WORK BREAKDOWN STRUCTURE AND DEFINITIONS OF
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
1 . Project Scope
As previously discussed, MIL-STD-881A provides seven
Summary WBS ' s for use by all contractors and DOD components
in the development of work breakdown structures for the
acquisition of defense materiel systems. Since this study
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addresses only aircraft systems, the WBS in Appendix A of
MIL-STD-881A will be the only structure presented and
discussed.
2 . Summary Work Breakdown Structure
The following is a Summary Work Breakdown Structure
for an aircraft system (MIL-STD-881A, 1975, p. 19) with the
elements of System Test and Evaluation in bold type:













































































3. System Test and Evaluation Definitions
a. System Test and Evaluation
The System Test and Evaluation element refers to
the use of prototype, production, or specially fabricated
hardware to obtain or validate engineering data on the
performance of the aircraft system. This element includes
the detailed planning, conduct, support, data reduction and
reports from such testing, and all hardware items which are
consumed or planned to be consumed in the conduct of such
testing. It also includes all effort associated with the
design and production of models, specimens, fixtures, and
instrumentation in support of the test program. Test
articles which are complete units (i.e., functionally
configured as required by the aircraft equipment) are
excluded. Development component acceptance, etc., testing
which can be specifically associated with the hardware
element, unless these tests are of special contractual or
engineering significance (e.g., associate contractor), are
also excluded. (MIL-STD-881A, 1975, p. 24)
b. Development Test and Evaluation
The Development Test and Evaluation (DT&E)
element refers to that test and evaluation conducted to:
1. Demonstrate that the engineering design and develop-
ment process is complete
2. Demonstrate that the design risks have been minimized
3. Demonstrate that the system will meet specifications
34
4. Estimate the system's military utility when introduced
5. Determine whether the engineering design is support-
able (practical, maintainable, safe, etc.), for
operational use
6. Provide test data with which to examine and evaluate
tradeoffs against specification requirements, life
cycle cost, and schedule.
DT&E is planned, conducted, and monitored by the
developing agency of the DOD component. It includes, for
example, such models and tests as wind tunnel, static, drop,
and fatigue; integration ground tests, engine military
qualification tests (MQT), preliminary flight rating tests
(PFRT), test bed aircraft and associated support;
development flight test, test instrumentation, test
equipment (including its support equipment), chase aircraft
and support thereto, etc. (MIL-STD-881A, 1975, p. 24)
c. Operational Test and Evaluation
The Operational Test and Evaluation element
refers to that test and evaluation conducted by agencies
other than the developing command to assess the prospective
systems' military utility, operational effectiveness,
operational suitability, logistics supportability (including
compatibility, interoperability, reliability, maintainabili-
ty, logistic requirements, etc.), cost of ownership, and
need for any modifications. Initial Operational Test and
Evaluation (lOT&E) conducted during the development of a
weapon system will be included in this element. This
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element encompasses such tests as flight tests, sea trials,
etc., and support thereto, required to prove the operational
capability of the deliverable system. It also includes
contractor support (e.g., technical assistance, maintenance,
labor, material, etc.) consumed during this phase of
testing. (MIL-STD-881A, 1975, p. 24)
d. Mockups
The Mockups element refers to the design
engineering and production of system or subsystem mockups
which have special contractual or engineering significance,
or which are not required solely for the conduct of one of
the above elements of testing. (MIL-STD-881A, 1975, p. 24)
e. Test and Evaluation Support
The Test and Evaluation Support element refers
to all support elements necessary to operate and maintain
systems and subsystems dxiring flight test and evaluation
which are not consumed during the flight-testing phase and
other support requirements that are not allocable to a
specific phase of testing. This element includes, for
example, repairable spares, repair of repairables, repair
parts, contractor technical support, etc., not allocable to
preceding test and evaluation elements. Operational and
maintenance personnel, consumables, special fixtures,
special instrumentation, etc., which are utilized and/ or
consumed in a single element of testing and which should.
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therefore, be included under that element of testing are
excluded. (MIL-STD-881A, 1975, p. 25)
f. Test Facilities
The Test Facilities element refers to those
special test facilities required for performance of the
various developmental tests necessary to prove the design
and reliability of the system or subsystem. This element
includes for example, engine test fixtures, white rooms,
test chambers, etc. The brick-and-mortar-type facilities
allocable to industrial facilities are excluded. (MIL-STD-
881A, 1975, p. 25)
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III. COST ANALYSIS PROBLEMS IN TEST
AND EVALUATION OF AIRCRAFT
A. INTRODUCTION
The Cost Analysis Division of the Naval Air Systems
Command (NAVAIR) in the early stage of concept formulation
initiates action to estimate costs and programmatics. These
concepts begin prior to the issuance of the initial request
for proposals when there is a perceived need for a new
aircraft system to the end of the demonstration/validation
phase of the aircraft system development life cycle.
The current practices in data collection and standar-
dization have been primarily designed for cost analysis and
estimation. There are several reasons for this lack of
analytical capability. First, definitions of costs elements
are sometimes ambiguous. Too frequently, there is a lack of
mutual effort to eliminate this ambiguity, which often leads
to a lack of standardization within contractors ' reports
required by the Department of Defense (DOD). In addition to
their ambiguity, MIL-STD-881A definitions apply only to
Levels 1, 2, and 3 of the Work Breakdown Structure (WBS).
Below Level 3, definitions are generally tailored to the
specific contract. This lack of specificity, for whatever
reason, makes it difficult to normalize data submitted under
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different contracts, which results in the inability to
effectively support trade-off analysis in the cost estimat-
ing process. NAVAIR established a CCDR Committee to enforce
compliance and provide oversight to ensure consistency
across programs, where appropriate. Figure 3.1 reproduces
the current draft generic structure of the WBS used by
NAVAIR when establishing the Project Summary WBS for use in
estimating/negotiating individual aircraft programs. The
final decision as to whether or not this WBS is used in the
negotiation of a program rests with the Program Manager.
B. THE COST ANALYSIS PROCESS
1 . Description of Current Practices
a. Development of the Project Work Breakdown
Structure
The cost analysis process is triggered at the
beginning of the conceptual phase of the Defense Material
Acquisition process. A Project Summary Work Breakdown
structure is developed by the DOD component utilizing the
category summaries in the appendices of MIL-STD-881A. This
Project Summary WBS will be identified to the concerned
contractors during RFP or solicitation. This proposed
structure will be negotiated with the contractors, who may
recommend changes to the proposed Contractor WBS that they
believe would improve its effectiveness in achieving the
goals of the system acquisition. The negotiated Contract
WBS will then be extended as far below Level 3 as required
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Level
v;bs # L 1 1 i 1 i
2000 Systems Test & Evaluation (ST&E)
2100 Development Test & Evaluation
2110 Contractor Flight Tests
2111 Instrumentation
2112 Functional Ground Checkout
2113 Flight Test & Demonstration
2114 Flight Test Support





2120 Wind Tunnel Article & Test
2121 Wind Tunnel Article
2122 Wind Tunnel Test
2130 Static Article & Test
2131 Static Article
2132 Static Test
2140 Fatigue Article & Test
2141 Fatigue Article
2142 Fatigue Test




WBS # L i. 1 1 1 i




2170 Avionics Integration Testing
2171 Test Bench/Laboratory
2172 Flying Test Bed
2173 Air Vehicle Equipment
2174 Avionics Test Program
2175 Software
2180 Navy Flight Test Prelim DT II
2190 Navy Flight Test Final DT II
21A0 Navy Flight Test DT III
21_0 Other DT&E (Specify at Level 4)
2200 Operational Test & Evaluation
2210 Preliminary OT II
2220 Final OT II
2230 OT III & IV
2300 Mockups
2400 Test & Evaluation Support
2410 Test & Evaluation Spares & Repair
Parts
2420 Test & Evaluation Support Equipment
2430 Test St Evaluation Technical/ .
Maintenance Services
2500 Test Facilities
2510 Avionics Integration Facility
25_0 Other (Specify at Level 4)
2600 Other ST&E (Specify)
Figure 3-lB. AIR-524 Standard Aircraft CCDR Work
Breakdown Structure Format
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to clearly define the extent of the contract. The Contract
WBS is combined with the Project Summary WBS to form the
Project WBS.
b. Purpose of the Project Work Breakdown Structure
The Project Summary WBS, and its derivatives,
are established early in the acquisition process to provide
a managerial and technical framework for all activities
throughout the acquisition life cycle. DOD Project Managers
are directed to utilize these work breakdown structures,
"as a coordinating medium in planning for further systems
engineering, resource allocation, cost estimates , contract
actions, and work execution. The reporting of progress,
performance, and engineering evaluations, as well as
financial data, shall be based on the Project WBS". (MIL-
STD-881A, 1975, p. 5)
c. Initial Cost Estimates
An initial part of the acquisition process
involves the Cost Analysis Division of NAVAIR. This
division is responsible for providing an initial rough order
of magnitude cost estimation of the proposed system, which
will be continually refined toward absolute accuracy
throughout the program life cycle. Once a program is
initiated, the Cost Analysis Division, based on system type
and acquisition phase, assigns analysts to perform more
detailed cost estimating and establish the initial cost
reporting requirements. "During preparation of the Request
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for Proposals (RFP) or solicitation, the procuring activity,
should determine the CCDR requirements. This involves
assessment of cost estimating needs and the contents of the
data elements which can be generated with the four reporting
forms". (NAVMAT P-5241, 1973, p. 2-1) The initial task
reports are further refined by a selected CCDR steering
committee composed of cost experts. The Program Analysis
Evaluation ( PAE ) section of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) reviews, directs modifications if necessary,
and approves the CCDR.
d. Reporting Requirements
With some exceptions, the data from contractors,
normally down to Level 3, are submitted to the NAVAIR Cost
Division every six months for dissemination and validation
for internal use. NAVAIR then systematically distributes
all the CCDR reports to pertinent parties within DOD (e.g.,
OSD, ASN, PAE). This procedure has been continuously used
since 1966 and there is no indication that this routine will
be altered in the foreseeable future due to two main
reasons. First, the current historical data base is seldom
implemented below Level 3 of the WBS , OSD probably feels the
need to maintain the integrity of this data base. Second,
the Office of Management and Budget (0MB) has established
guidelines requiring OSD to minimize the reporting require-
ments placed on the contractors by the CCDR system. This
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seems to concur with the administration policy to reduce the
volume of bureaucratic paperwork.
2. Implementation Shortcomings of the Present System; A
Cost Analysis Perspective
The current system requires contractors to report at
varied WBS levels, however, from a cost estimating perspec-
tive reporting requirements continue to inappropriately
fluctuate from one contract to another. Regardless of the
depth required in the WBS, contractors claim (despite the
fact that the CIR/CCDR system reporting requirements have
been known since the mid 60 's) that it is too difficult to
convert their accounting systems to accommodate the defini-
tions given by the CCDR system; an argument with which
NAVAIR strongly disagrees. To further complicate the
problem, dual source and sub-contracts are often granted.
Due to their competitiveness, contractors often cannot, or
even do not want to cooperate with other contractors
.
For a long time, by analyzing all of the elements of
the work breakdown structure, discrete answers were genera-
ted to reply to trade-off questions coming from high-level
authorities (e.g., ASN, SYSCOM) . However, the required data
are often not available. When they are available, their
quality is questionable, making it difficult to provide
reliable estimates for lower level WBS elements. Usually,
answers to questions require data below Level 3 of the WBS.
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It is difficult to obtain periodic (six-month
period) reporting costs below Level 3 of the WBS without
encountering resistance from OSD and contractors. The
latter often claim that it would cost too much to maintain
such a data base. This argument may be true for some
contractors, but it is not true industry-wide. Interviews
performed for this study have indicated that most contrac-
tors have for a long time maintained data bases with monthly
data for internal use that potentially contain information
for detailed and frequent estimation needs. Most of the
contractors interviewed maintain data at least one level
below that required by the Project WBS. In fact, some of
these data bases reflect elements down to Levels 8 and 9.
It would probably be neither as expensive nor as time-
consuming/ as contractors claim, to provide periodic cost
reports below Level 3, especially considering the fact that
CIR/CCDR requirements have existed since 1967, and the
capabilities of modern day computers to reformat/reaggregate
contractor's cost accounts into CCDR format.
C. RECOMMENDED COURSE OF ACTION
1 . Necessity to Break the WBS to Lower Level
Regardless of fiscal, political and technical
considerations, it is critical for the cost analyst to have
access to accurate data below Level 3 of the WBS for
meaningful data analysis. In Level 2, System Test and
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Evaluation WBS and distribution of Direct Contract Labor
Hours of a typical military fixed-wing aircraft. Of the
four Level 3 sub-elements, Development Test and Evaluation
accounts for 93.6% of the contract total System Test and
Evaluation labor hours.
The Level 3 element Development Test and Evaluation
(WBS # 2100) had to be broken down to its Level 4 sub-
elements to capture its major cost WBS elements. By
referring to WBS # 2119, it can be found that Contractor
Flight Tests account for 43.3% of Level 3 Development Test
and Evaluation, which corresponds to 40.6% of Level 2 System
Test and Evaluation. The three remaining Level 3 sub-
elements account for only 6.4% of the total contract labor
hours. In particular, TECHEVAL costs which are on Level 3
(WBS # 2200) were minimal, amounting to 0.4% of Level 2
System Test and Evaluation.
In the long run, it would be advisable to restruc-
ture the WBS system by revising the hierarchy of the WBS
elements. One recommendation for revision would be to
remove Development Test and Evaluation (WBS # 2100) from
Level 3 and replace it with selected major WBS elements
currently located on Level 4. In addition to the obvious
choice of selecting the Contractor Flight Test element to be
moved to Level 3, other Level 4 sub-elements contain
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TABLE 3-1. SYSTEM TEST AND EVALUATION DIRECT
CONTRACT LABOR HOUR DISTRIBUTION
-Level Percentage of Total
WBS #234 Contract Labor Hours
2000 SYSTEM T&E 100
2100 DEV TEST 93..6
2110 SYSTEM REQ 9.4
2111 WIND TUNNEL 4.3
2112 STATIC T&A 5.8
2113 FATIGUE T&A 6.0
2114 A/V SUB TEST 8.6
2116 AVNX INT TEST 6.6
2117 ARM/WPN INT 0.7
2118 FLT SIM PROG 1.5
2119 CTR FLT TEST 40.6
2190 MISC 6.6
2191 DROP & ACL LOADS 3.5
2200 TECHEVAL 0..4
2220 FLT TEST PRO SPT 0.4
2400 MOCKUPS 4 .5
2500 T&E SUPPORT 1 .5
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significant percentages of the total System Test and
Evaluation efforts and should also be considered for a move
to Level 3 of the WBS.
The prospective of implementing a revised version of
the WBS system depends much on the personalities of the con-
stituencies involved in the process, and the organizations
created around programs. System Commands should ensure that
CCDR oversight committees are formed to review current
procedures, and enforce proper implementation. The coopera-
tion of contractors, as well as DOD components, will be a
vital part of this effort, which will involve optimizing and
sharing by all concerned,
2. Necessity to Provide Time-Phased Data Reporting
Data should be reported in more depth, systematical-
ly, and in a time-phased fashion. Time is a big cost
driver in some elements. For example. Contractor Test
Flight costs seem to relate to the length of the test
periods. A side benefit of this would be that cost esti-
mators would have an improved historical base for profiling
cost estimates into annual budget increments to predict
Research and Development costs for each year. While it is
difficult to derive an optimal frequency of time series data
reporting, it would make sense to argue that yearly reports
are minimally adequate. Monthly data would be preferable
since they would capture the detailed trend of labor hours
incurred throughout the system development life-cycle, but
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might not be cost effective. It is a question of the effort
required to convert data from contractor to the CCDR system
format, and the normalization of data across various
contractor inputs. As a compromise, semi-annual data would
be acceptable and more cost effective, since all contractors
have computerized accounting systems to maintain their costs
internally. Due to the long process of aircraft system
development, semi-annual data are expected to provide
sufficiently detailed information for trend analysis.
3 . Implementation of a well-defined CCDR Data base
System
As it is defined in Chapter II, the purpose of the
CCDR system is to provide the primary data base for use in
most cost estimating efforts including procurement manage-
ment activities. As discussed earlier, the realization of
this effort has been dampened by the lack of standardized
data format among similar programs below Level 3 of the WBS.
It seems thus evident that one of the first steps to be
taken is to elaborate a comprehensive, consistent, and
precise WBS Elements Dictionary that can be:
1. Agreed upon by all DOD components as well as the
Defense Industry
2. Implemented for cost analysis purposes.
Ideally, the new definitions would serve as foundations for
building a data base system that compiles all data in an
accessible, dynamic, and evolving data base, readily avai-
lable for retrieval and modification for modelling and
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analysis. Historically, required reporting elements have
been inconsistently determined across contracts for similar
weapon systems. The required levels of reporting within the
WBS have often been inconsistent among the different DOD
components. Individual contracts have also been negotiated
to allow some obscuring of information due to subcontractor
reporting variances and deficiencies. Labor cost com-
parisons in terms of dollar expenditures do not provide a
basis for consistent comparison due to changing economic
price levels. Variances between contractor methods of
accounting also generate ambiguity. For instance, some
contractors may allocate labor hour expenditures for direct
maintenance and operational support of the test vehicle to
engineering costs, while others may allocate the same
function to manufacturing costs. These factors do not imply
inaccuracy of the data, but do induce inconsistency when
comparing and correlating individual models of aircraft and
Defense Contractors.
The utilization of the Contractor Cost Data
Reporting system data base to provide explicit estimates for
sub-elements of aircraft system test and evaluation has not
been expedient. Lower levels of data than previously found
in the Work Breakdown Structure should be analyzed in order
to effectively obtain the desired information and accurate results.
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IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY




This research seeks to: (i) assess current problems
in Cost Analysis in Aircraft System Test and Evaluation,
(ii) establish guidelines for estimating data, (iii) design
and implement a database structure for Aircraft System Test
and Evaluation, and (iv) develop parametric cost estimating
relationships for selected System Test and Evaluation
elements and four functional cost categories. Specifically,
this research will focus on:
1. Defining a sample of pertinent aircraft programs
2. Formulating a WBS structure/functional cost element
matrix
3. Acquiring historical cost data
4. Organizing the data for analysis
5. Employing statistical methods to develop cost estimat-
ing relationships
6. Documenting data, sources, rationale, and methodology.
2 Scope
This research attempts to apply econometric theory
and cost analysis in the area of Aircraft Systems Test and
Evaluation (ASTE), Multiple linear and logarithmic regres-
sion are probably major analytical tools. Since data are
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not readily available from a single source to the detail
required for econometric studies, it is necessary to
establish an operational data structure that can be used as
a basis for this research and facilitate its data collec-
tion.
This research also applies the concepts defined in
system analysis and design to implement decision support
software for ASTE. Such an implementation would greatly
help cost analysts interact with the complex and diverse
data base. Consequently, the reliability cf their cost
estimation would be enhanced, or, at least, limitations of
estimating methods clearly understood.
Interviews with defense contractors, Patuxent River
Naval Air Test Center, Edwards Air Force Base Flight Test
Center, and on-site data collection are envisaged for the
first part of the research. Utilization of statistical
software packages to identify elasticities of cost drivers
will constitute the second part of the research.
B. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
As stated in the previous section, this research
encompasses both analytical and empirical studies. The
methodology adopted for this research follows a three-step
process shown in Figure 4-1. The activities of each of the
three steps are briefly described below.
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1. Exploration Phase: This phase includes the initial
statement of the problem, the assessment of its
importance and feasibility, and the establishment of
contacts with access to relevant data.
2. Analysis Phase: This is an analytical approach to
problem solving that requires the clarification of
goals, definition of objectives and identification of
systematic research activities to achieve these goals.
3. Refinement: This constitutes an iterative process to
gradually readjust actions required to better meet
stated objectives. Particularly, this process would
highlight the sensitivity of decisions, the values of
the key cost drivers and assumptions on which es-
timates are base including economic, technical,






Figure 4-1. Phases of Research Methodology
C. EXPLORATION
The Exploration Phase was generated by an attempt to
define the scope and objectives centering on the issues of
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controlling and estimating test and evaluation costs.
However, this research team's focus was not clarified until
initial meetings with the Cost Analysis Division of NAVAIR,
held on August 7-8, 1986. Although there is a need to
develop cost estimators for all of the Systems Test and
Evaluation elements, it was confirmed at that time that
initial efforts should be confined to the Contractor Flight
Test element, and if feasible, expand the research to
include the Wind Tunnel Article and Test, Static Article and
Test, and Fatigue Article and Test elements. On-site visits
at the Naval Air Test Center, as well as interaction with a
selected group of representatives, demonstrated some
feasibility of data collection and identified potential cost
drivers, particularly in the area of aircraft weight and
speed, and flight test hours. The initial Problem Defini-
tion in Figure 4-2 was developed following these meetings.
D. ANALYSIS
Based on the initial problem definition (Figure 4-2),
a study was conducted to investigate the economic, political
and technical feasibility of attaining the defined objec-
tives. While no insurmountable problems in the financial
and technical aspects were envisaged, the accessibility of
contractors' proprietary data was identified as a potential-
ly insurmountable political consideration that could
severely constrain the realization of the intended research.
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PROBLEM DEFINITION
STATEMENT OP SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES: August 7-8, 1986
BETWEEN: Naval Postgraduate School
AND: Naval Air Systems Command
PROJECT: Cost Analysis for Aircraft System Test and
Evaluation - Data Collection.
PROBLEM:
OBJECTIVES;
There is an increasing requirement from high
levels that the Navy's aircraft cost es-
timators/analysts provide explicit estimates
for the sub-elements of aircraft systems test
and evaluation efforts. These data are not
presently available at the levels required by
the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR).
Collection of data to facilitate NAVAIR '
s
development of cost estimating relationships
for the following test and evaluation elements:
Contractor Flight Test, Wind Tunnel Article &
Testr Static Article & Test and Fatigue Article
& Test.
SCOPE: Project to be completed within six
calendar months at a cost of no more than
$45,000. Availability and willingness of
contractors to provide data that could be
considered proprietary. Inflexibility of




Visits to Defense Contractors' facilities
to discuss the problem and to ascertain
the accessability and availability of the
required data. Establish a database to
facilitate the analysis of the data.
FEASIBILITY STUDY:
A feasibility study should be conducted
with the results submitted within two
calendar weeks. The cost of the feasibil-
ity study is included in the project scope
and will not exceed $2000.
Figure 4-2. Initial Problem Definition
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To minimize the impact of this political constraint, a
strategy was formulated to ensure the viability of the data
collection process by:
1. Identifying contacts and soliciting their cooperation
2. Conducting on-site interviews.
1. Identifying Contacts and Soliciting Cooperation
NAVAIR provided a list of twenty-one contacts
throughout the defense industry. Through phone conversa-
tions and correspondence (Appendix A) , this list was refined
and expanded to those that indicated not only an interest in
the results of the research, but a cooperative attitude
concerning the request for company data (Appendix B) dealing
with System Test and Evaluation.
In general, respondents were highly interested in
the nature of the project and indicated their willingness to
assist in data collection and critical evaluation of the
present cost analysis process. Those who declined to
participate cited the following reasons;
1. The lack of available data
2. The current political climate within the industry, and
3. On-going contract negotiations.
The final list consisted of thirteen companies, which made
available personnel from a wide range of aircraft-related
disciplines as depicted in Figure 4-3.
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Figure 4-3, Interviewees Job Description Breakdown
2 . On-site Interviews
Interviews were conducted at thirteen locations
throughout the United States. Interview teams consisted of
at least two research members per visit. Surveying time
lasted, on the average, approximately three hours for each
location, varying from forty-five minutes to ten hours.
To prepare for the interviews, the research team
brainstormed to establish the following initial list of
issues that appeared to be important for the research
methodology.
1. What are the cost drivers in ASTE?
2. How do the characteristics and complexity of the
aircraft relate to the average engineering hour?
3. What statistical and econometric models can be
appropriately applied to ASTE? Is multiple regression
appropriate to this problem?
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4. Are the military work-breakdown structures pertinent
to ASTE?
5. How can a computer system (hardware and software) be
designed and implemented to conduct testing of the
models?
6. How have data been defined and collected in different
test sites (military and civilian)? Can they be
filtered, and standardized? What extrapolation method
should be used for missing data?
7. How do these cost drivers affect the average engineer-
ing hour per hour of flight?
8. Is there any correlation between the number of
instrumentation channels and the number of engineering
hours?
9. Is there a linear cost relationship between different
types of aircraft with respect to their complexity and
characteristics?
10. How sensible and stable are the elasticities of the
cost drivers?
11. What are the implications of the findings?
12. Where is it most cost-effective to conduct future
military ASTE—at the contractors facilities or at the
established flight test centers. Is the answer the
same for both flight test centers?
13. Do the findings have an impact on the service's opera-
tional test and evaluation?
14. How does inflation affect the predictive power of the
findings?
This initial list of questions was sent to interested
parties. Additionally, to improve our own understanding of
industry practices and procedures, the list of issues were
distilled to the following set of questions that could be
addressed in on-site interviews.
1. Would you provide general specifications of all your
company's aircraft to include: aircraft type and mis-
sion, thrust to weight ratio, speed, size, ceiling,
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combat radius, commonality/GFE between models, and use
of exotics and/or composites?
2. What methodologies do you use for accounting and
record keeping of cost items (development and test-
ing)?
3. How are these accounting and record keeping items
defined? Are these definitions standardized company
wide? Do you have a computerized cost accounting
system?
4. What methodologies do you use to extrapolate cost
estimators from these data?
5. In the area of avionics, what impact do variations in
the following items have on the labor hours and flight
test hours of your aircraft systems:
a. The number of instrumentation channels.
b. Number of lines of delivered software code.
c. The number of separate CPU's installed in the
aircraft.
d. New electronic technology (e.g., VSLI )
.
e. What hardware integration factors affect the
cost (i.e., is a decentralized system more cost-
effective than a centralized system?).
f. Power usage.
6. What do you believe are the most important cost-
drivers? Could you prioritize them?
7. If due to cost constraints you had to reduce test and
evaluation activities, what would be your primary
candidates for elimination? Which activities do you
consider indispensible to test and evaluation?
8. What would you do to reduce costs?
This set of questions permitted a cross comparison among
companies. More interesting, it was found that, as the
interview progressed, the domain knowledge of the research
team expanded exponentially which improved the quality of
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the remaining discussions. The contacts below also raised
numerous issues they thought significant enough to included
in the research.
12 November 1986
















Air Force Flight Test Center



















Naval Air Test Flight Center
Patuxent River, Maryland
As the interview process continued, important issues
converged demonstrating a industry-wide commonality of
problems (see Chapter V).
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E. REFINEMENTS
A post-interview meeting was convened at NAVAIR to
assess the results of the contractor visits. The research
team reported to the sponsor the nature and amount of data
that were, and could be, collected. Also, the sponsor was
briefed on the areas considered most important by contrac-
tors ( see Chapter V), which they had recommended be added





4. Requirements to meet performance guaranties
5. Contract warranties required by the Government
6. Fixed-priced contracts and
7. Combined DOD / Contractor Flight Testing.
It became obvious that these new dimensions could
contribute to the rapid growth of the present project scope.
If they were all included, it would no longer be feasible to
accomplish the totality of the project given the constraints
imposed. Therefore, the team requested the sponsor to
refocus the problem and set research priorities in light of
these new factors. It was then stated that the focus would
remain on Contractor Flight Test, with Wind Tunnel Test,
Static Test, and Fatigue Test studies as secondary goals.
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In order to achieve this restated goal, interpreta-
tion, review, and standardization of data became indispen-
sible. Due to his expertise, the sponsor offered his
assistance. This operation is time intensive, requiring
tedious and systematic efforts. In the meantime, a follow-
up letter was sent to contractors seeking time-phased data
(Appendix C). In parallel, a data base was designed to
accommodate the data received from the contractors (see
Volume II, Chapter III).
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V. COST DRIVERS IN SYSTEM TEST AND EVALUATION
A. INTRODUCTION
Past studies have primarily considered, weight, speed
and the number of aircraft as the most statistically
significant cost estimators. In fact, other cost drivers
—
such as avionics, software, management strategies--have
recently emerged as important, if not more important than
these three drivers. Unfortunately, due to the current
practices of data collection, it is impossible to statically
quantify the new cost drivers. The only approach that
remains appropriate to evaluate the importance of these
drivers is to use the Delphi technique to solicit expert
opinions in the aircraft system cost estimation area.
Interviews with aerospace engineers, pilots. Test and
Evaluation managers from Defense Contractors and DOD, test
flight centers, and defense contractors have been conducted
to brainstorm issues regarding Aircraft Systems Test and
Evaluation costs.
B. IDENTIFICATION OF THE MOST IMPORTANT COST DRIVERS
1 . Mission as the Determinant of Cost Drivers
Mission is the cornerstone upon which any major
program is built. Until the mission of the proposed
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aircraft system is defined, it is not possible to determine
specifications; even at a broad level. However, once the
mission is known, then the many factors that form the
complex world of Defense Systems Development and Acquisition
begin to come together. Many of these factors are clearly
defined and are measurable cost drivers that will be
discussed later in this chapter. It is important to note,
however, that there exists an environment within which DOD
and Defense Contractors operate that effects all programs as
surely as the more obvious cost drivers.
One of the major managerial concerns is whether a
bid can be submitted in such a way that it will not only
allow the company to develop and produce the system within
the defined financial constraints, but insure that there is
a means available to recoup the cost of DOD's "inevitable"
modifications to the specifications and/or performance
guarantees. It is no longer a matter of "if" there will be
changes, but rather a question of "when and how many". The
Cost Plus Contract provided the contractor with an insurance
clause, which often proved to be very expensive from the
government's perspective. The Fixed Price Contract now
mandated by DOD has removed this insurance clause, provided
DOD with protection from cost overruns, and has moved the
"risk factor" to the contractor. Since it should not be
considered unreasonable for either DOD or the contractor to
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expect some changes over the long developmental life cycle
of a major weapon system, the present relationship is one
punctuated with compromise and conciliation. If it were
otherwise, the development and attainment of a program's
performance objectives would be impossible.
The requirement to provide warranties on an aircraft
system that has yet to be built, and whose operational life
is unknown, is another major management concern in the early
stages of a program. How does an analyst quantify costs,
for inclusion in a bid, that are so unpredictable? And how
does management calibrate the experience and expertise of
its engineers in cost estimators? Are the cost estimates as
accurate as the specifications and performance guarantees?
Sub-contractors and secondary vendors are often
trapped into making guarantees too early in the process.
Their desire to be a part of the program leaves them with no
other alternative, and as a result the integrated overall
mission is typically not met.
When a ceiling dollar value is included in a Request
for Proposals there are few contractors who will refrain
from bidding the indicated ceiling, even if their own cost
estimators believe that it will be impossible to stay below




All companies interviewed indicated that weight
still constitutes a major cost driver in system development.
Because of the availability of the data on weights, it has
been relatively easy to use weight as a cost estimator.
Dollars and hours per pound have often been used as es-
timators. Everything else being equal, the larger the
aircraft the greater the cost, i.e., a bomber, which is
approximately five times heavier than a fighter, has overall
costs (Level 2 of the WBS) that are roughly five times more
than that of the fighter. This interpretation corresponds
to earlier studies performed by PRC (1967), RAND (1972,
1975, 1976), and Noah (1973). These studies all ranked
weight as the primary cost driver. As weight increases,
cost increases too. However, as weight increases, at some
point, cost per pound decreases. Additionally, aircraft
density effects the cost per pound of aircraft. As an
aircraft is loaded with more sub-systems (e.g.. Avionics),
cost per pound of the aircraft increases.
Recent use of composites has altered the statistical
quality of weight as a cost estimator since historical data
are associated with metal. It has been hypothesized that as
more experience is gained with composites, weight will again
become a more stable and predictable factor because of the
nature of building with composites. Although testing an
aircraft component built entirely with composites should be
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easier, one of the major uncertainties when dealing with
composites in the Contractor Flight Test phase occurs when
an test-site modification or repair to an aircraft is
required. With the increased use of composites in the
future, weight is expected to move from labor-intensive to a
automation(capital)-intensive factor. While it is still
difficult to predict at the present time how the use of
composites will drive the cost associated with weight, it is
plausible that developmental testing will progressively
become less expensive. It is also hard to relate weight of
composites to cost since there are more parts in non-
composite aircraft than in composite aircraft.
3. Aircraft Speed
After weight, speed is also recognized as an
important cost drivers. However, it was identified only by
70% of the opinions solicited. Thrust being constant,
weight is related to speed. One of the reasons that speed
represents an important cost driver is the fact that due to
the requirement to meet performance guaranties, development
costs increase at a spiraling rate as engineers work with
the aircraft at critical speeds. The reduced total weight
of an aircraft due to the use of composites will decrease
the thrust required to attain the same speed of a non-
composite aircraft, and as a consequence, developmental cost
in this area should be diminished.
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4. Avionics Complexity
With one exception, avionics complexity was another
cost driver that emerged from the interviews. Advanced
electronic technology has resulted in improved reliability
of avionics and substantial amelioration in troubleshooting
and maintenance procedures. Test effectiveness, test
vehicle flight frequency, and data validity have greatly
improved. Many contractors claimed that achievement in
avionics have been responsible for their recent gain in
program planning effectiveness and sortie rates of their
flight test programs.
While software-intensive avionics substantially
innovates the capabilities of aircraft systems, it also
presents enormous testing requirements. For example, a high
percentage of test work accomplished by the Air Force for
the F-15, F-16, and B-l is related to software. When the
volume allocated to avionics within the airframe is con-
stant, advanced technology decreases the weight and in-
creases the avionics capabilities. This implies that while
more complex aircraft can be built without affecting the
costs related to increased weight and speed, the complexity
of avionics will drive the total system costs up. Avionics




Indeed, an important factor that has emerged from
the increased avionics complexity is software. Unlike
weight, there is a predominant concern on developing the
ability to accurately estimate software costs. This element
is regarded as the most difficult cost driver to estimate.
First, there is little consistency among companies in the
way aircraft system software is developed. Some develop by
total system concepts, others modularize by functional areas
(e.g., navigation, fire controls, weapons), and still others
concentrate on implementing interfaces between blackboxes
developed by various sub-contractors. Second, estimation
methods range from dollars-per-word to parametric models
based on total lines of codes. These models include COCOMO,
SLIM, RCA/PRICE/S, IBM Walston-Felix , and Boeing Computer
Service. (Wolverton, 1980) However, the complete lack of
historical data and experience with Aircraft System Test and
Evaluation software makes it virtually impossible to apply
these parametric models. (For a survey of parametric models,
see Volume II, Chapter II.) The estimation problem is
further complicated by the fact that software costs depend
on the number of modules, the size of the modules, the
degree of integration complexity, and the number of proces-
sors in distributed systems available to run the integrated
software system.
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It is felt that the mission determines the software
costs. For example, a training mission does not require a
complex software structure as compared to an all-weather
attack mission. Consequently, software costs for the
trainer are much less expensive than for those of the all-
weather attack aircraft. In addition to the primary
mission, the specific number of mission tasks the aircraft
is capable of performing does play an important factor. For
example, in general, the ECM mission would derive a higher
software cost than the ASW mission. However, the software
cost of the AWACS is higher than the E-2C. These two
aircraft perform similar missions but on different scale.
Another comparison would be between the F/A-18 and the A-6.
If both aircraft were built from the ground up using today's
technology, the software cost of the multi-mission F/A-18
would probably be substantially higher than the A-6.
A strategy to deal the increasing cost of testing
software intensive system is to use simulation. Research
conducted at the Air Force Flight Test Center, Edwards Air
Force Base argues that:
1. Three-fourths of all software problems are resolvable
on the ground at a fraction of a cost of a flight
2. A reduction in test flying hours translates into a
reduction of test costs and an acceleration of the
test schedule
3. The costly and inefficient fly-fix-fly approach is
minimized
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4, Ground testing is more efficient than flight testing
because the experiment is controlled, repetition of
test conditions is rapid and simple
5. Flight test time is used more effectively by isolat-
ing/keying on risks areas and smarter profile plan-
ning. (Adolf and Montgomery, 1985, p. 3)
Tables 5-1 and 5-2 show expected cost savings for a typical
fighter test program utilizing simulation of software-
intensive systems.
A second approach to resolving the problem of
software cost estimation would be for the entire Defense
Industry to officially endorse the utilization of structured
analysis and design methodology through functional decom-
position. (Yourdon, 1986) Such decomposition by functions
would make it easier for software developers to capture the
complexity of each function and systematically integrate
them as a total system for cost estimation. Similar
software engineering techniques and experience will result
in more standardized data collection needed for future
estimation.
Another potential area of improvement is the
implementation of distributed systems using parallel
processors. While no statistical evidence was gathered to
assess the impact of separate CPUs on aircraft testing, the
majority of interviewees believe that the conduct of tests
and the probability of completion during a specific flight
were enhanced when several CPUs were installed, permitting
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TABLE 5-2
COST OF FLIGHTS:
(250 FLIGHTS) (1.25 HRS/FLT) ($20.000/HR)
LESS COST OF SIMULATION:
(250 FLIGHTS) (1 HR/FLT) ($4,000/HR)
NET SAVINGS FROM REDUCED FLIGHTS:
(20 AIRCRAFT MONTHS) ( SI ,000 ,000/MONTH)






have failed. In the past, a central CPU failure precluded
continuation of the testing process.
6. Power Supplies
Power supplies play a vital role in the operation of
all aircraft. These power sources provide a range of
outputs depending on the requirements and number of the
devices they support. This accounts for the varied capabil-
ities, sizes and quantities of power supplies that can be
found in any aircraft system.
The majority of the volume and weight of a typical
power unit is taken up by the filters required to ensure
that delivered current is within specified operating ranges.
When compared to the technological advances made in other
avionics areas, it is obvious that there has been very
little progress in the area of reducing or eliminating these
unit filters, thereby improving the overall efficiency,
presently necessary to meet the requirement specifications.
If more efficient power units were developed, the number of
these sources could be reduced, thereby reducing the total
weight and volume of avionics in the aircraft. Also, if





Data reduction, which is the process of reviewing
and analyzing the data gathered during testing, presents
another area of concern. Compounding this problem is the
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increased number of instrumentation channels. With the
advent of a central bus within the airframe, engineers have
recognized the potential for monitoring additional data
points that were not previously feasible. Convinced that
these data could now be gathered relatively easily, they
requested that procedures for monitoring additional data
points be included in the test plan. Most contractors felt
that this process would be cost effective since it would
provide a wide cross section of data on each and every
flight which would allow maximum concurrent testing regard-
less of the primary purpose of that flight.
However, the current technology that assists in
analyzing data has not progressed as fast as technology's
ability to produce raw data. Collected data have become so
voluminous and overwhelming to the extent that it has become
impossible for the engineers to properly analyze all of the
data unless the time constraints of the test program were
extended.
8. The Number of Test Aircraft
The number of test aircraft also constitutes an
important cost element. Historically, it was observed that
this cost driver was considered one of the most significant
in flight test cost estimation, along with weight and speed.
(PRC, 1967; RAND, 1972; RAND 1975) As the number of
aircraft increases, the number of separate test flight
augments and drives the total cost higher. aircraft are
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instrumented to perforin specific portions of the test plan
and therefore cross utilization is infeasible unless
aircraft are modified for other specific tests. The
determination of an optimal number of aircraft is extremely
difficult since the cost relationship is not linear. If the
number of aircraft is below the testing capacity then
testing resources are wasted. Conversely, when the number
of aircraft exceeds the testing capacity, there is a loss of
the maximum utilization of test aircraft assets and ex-
perienced personnel. As an attempt to reduce costs,
contractors argue that the number of aircraft used in flight
testing should be held to the minimum required to meet the
test plan schedule. They felt that DOD as a whole should not
have as much input in determining the number of test
aircraft as it is presently exercised.
9 . Delivery Schedule
It is expected that this cost element is gaining in
importance due to the:
1. Increasing complexity of aircraft
2, Requirements to meet all performance guaranties imposed
by the Government prior to the first delivery of pro-
duction aircraft.
As a proposition to reduce this problem, it was proposed by
several contractors that aircraft be delivered in a block
(phase) program. A block program would consist of quickly
delivering a small number of operational aircraft capable of
meeting at least 80% of mission requirements. As the
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aircraft are used by operational units, additional feedback
would be inputted to improve the performance of subsequent
production blocks of aircraft. Operational input to the
test program would insure that the aircraft, as designed,
are in fact meeting real needs. This would allow contrac-
tors to continue utilizing test aircraft to solve any
problems which inhibited the attainment of all performance
guaranties, without delaying the delivery of operational
aircraft to DOD. Although this would most certainly result
in a requirement to retrofit/modify the initial block of
aircraft, it is felt that this procedure would ultimately
provide a more capable aircraft to operational units in a
more timely manner. However, this strategy would create a
potential problem in the upgrading of the early delivered
aircraft. Usually, the cost of modification is significant-
ly greater than the cost of initial production.
10 . Joint Contractor/Military Testing
Various degrees of joint testing have been prac-
ticed by DOD. It consists of combining the efforts of the
contractors and the military in the parallel testing. These
combined efforts include the development, test, and evalua-
tion phases. Advantages of this approach include:
1. Early involvement of operational aircrew and sharing
of test data from the genesis of the test program
2. Reduced duplication of efforts
3. A new critical perspective of the progress of the
program that could help identify shortcomings or
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problem areas in the early stages of the test program
that otherwise might not have been identified until
the Operational Test and Evaluation phase; this would
lead to substantial savings in time and costs.
Contractors feel that they no longer have primary
control over their own flight test programs. The require-
ment to use government test sites and facilities, which are
inadequately equipped to support simultaneous test programs
of major aircraft systems, is viewed as counterproductive.
These inadequacies require that program priorities be
established which results in test delays and some, if not
all, of the following ramifications to the contractors:
1. They have to relocate their personnel and test
equipment to governmental facilities
2. They have to train military test pilots in highly
instrumented test aircraft
3. Flight schedules must be submitted to the military for
approval before actual real time planning can begin
4. They are subject to DOD rules and regulations, which
many find too restrictive
5. Their schedules are often reviewed by military
personnel who may not be familiar with the intricacies
of the contractor's flight test program. The explana-
tions and briefings required to clear up these
misunderstandings cause unnecessary interruptions in
the test program
6. The turnover of key military personnel during the Test
and Evaluation programs often precipitates revisions
of previously reviewed and approved cockpit/aircraft
configurations
.
From the contractors' viewpoint, the requirements
specifications initially established at the beginning of the
program are constantly modified during the System Test and
Evaluation life cycle. Contractors contend that, given
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accurate, detailed, and complete DOD specifications, they
could complete the required Developmental Test and Evalua-
tion more effectively and efficiently without interference
from external agencies. As such, the contractors would
ultimately be responsible for development testing, test
management, and more important, test success.
It is important to note that opinions in this issue
have been extremely bimodal. Historical data could be found
to support both sides of the issue as both management
strategies have been successful in producing high quality
aircraft for the Department of Defense. Since these
arguments cover only a partial view of the entire problem,
further studies are necessary to determine which strategy is
capable of producing the highest quality and most cost-
efficient aircraft. Specifically, a more integral approach
appears to be the only way to assess the total impact of the
two strategies.
11. Political
Last but not least. Congressional funding delays
are cited as having a non-trivial impact on the total system
cost. These delays caused an unnecessary time lag between
the development and production phases. This lack of im-
mediate follow-up results in loss of experience and exper-
tise gained in the prototyping phase and serious economical
and personnel problems in maintaining qualified manpower.
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C . SUMMARY
The interviews conducted with Defense Contractors and
the military test centers resulted in numerous recommen-
dations for improvement of the present process of System
Test and Evaluation. While the following summarized list of
recommendations addressed in this chapter represents neither
an exhaustive nor final list of possible actions, they do
highlight several areas of major concern:
1. The use of simulation in software testing
2. The utilization of a structured analysis and design
methodology to develop software
3. The implementation of distributed systems using
parallel processors
4. The development of more efficient power units,
thereby reducing the total weight and volume of
avionics in the aircraft
5. The reduction of the required number of test
aircraft
6. The delivery of aircraft in a block (phase) program.
Also, further studies are necessary to determine if joint
testing is producing the highest quality and most
cost-efficient aircraft.
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I have extracted some information from our thesis proposal
to give you a better idea of what this project entails and will
try to accomplish. I have also enclosed a tentative format
depicting a Work Breakdown Structure/Functional Cost Element
Matrix which, with some flexibility, will attempt to use in our
data collection effort. I will call you on the rd to answer
any questions you may have concerning the project and provide you
an update of our latest discussions with NAVAIR.
The week of November 16th, we will be making a cross-country
collection trip to all of the defense contractor facilities
involved in this project. We would like to meet with you in
Columbus, Monday morning, November 17th, to collect the initial
data you have extracted, and discuss the project in more detail.
We realize that doesn't give you very much time, but we are
trying to have most of the initial data, from all sources,
collected and reviewed for discussion at a NAVAIR meeting in
Washington D. C. November 20th. This meeting will be used to
finalize the focus of the data needed to complete this research
project. We will contact you immediately upon our return from
the NAVAIR meeting to advise you of the results of the meeting
and to eliminate any ambiguities concerning the data we received
and finalize our further data collection requirements. We
anticipate two follow-on trips. The first for final collection
of data, the second to present the results of our research and
copies of our cost estimating tools.
The basic data we will need will be the direct labor hours
and flight hours related to all DOD aircraft systems your
facility helped produce.
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The information we require necessitates a breakdown of
Contractor Flight Test, Wind Tunnel Test, Static Test, and
Fatigue Test into the lowest available indentured sub-elements
that your company used during system test and evaluation.
It is important to our efforts that we obtain the Contractor
Flight Test labor hours, in particular, in a time-phased fashion
along with time-phased flight hours, so as to be able to relate
the two. We would also like to obtain time-phased cost data for
the other test elements if possible.
We would like to meet with the individuals who develop the
initial Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) estimates to discuss their
ideas on what factors became the cost-drivers. If available,
inputs from flight test engineers would contribute significantly
to the balance of the data we are collecting.
I realize that we are asking for what you may consider to
be part of your company's proprietary information. I assure you,
in the strongest possible terms, that all data will be held in
the strictest confidence, used only for the generation of a cost
estimating algorithm, and not divulged outside of the government.
We appreciate your cooperation and look forward to working
together in the coming months.
Semper Fi
,
William J. Foster David F. Lee
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A. PROJECT TEAM
Dr. Tung X. Bui Assistant Professor NPS
LCDR Robert W. Fonnesbeck 529-66-1259 USN
Major William J. Foster 537-50-0275 USMC
Major David J. Lee 568-74-7785 USMC




Current budget constraints have resulted in an increasing
emphasis on the cost effective procurement of aircraft
systems within the Department of Defense. Of late, the Cost
Analysis Division of the Naval Air Systems Command
(NAVAIR) has received numerous requests to provide explicit
estimates for the sub-elements of aircraft system test and
evaluation efforts. These data represent lower levels in
the Work Breakdown Structure than previously required. This
additional data and the methods necessary to produce them
are needed in order to estimate aircraft system test and
evaluation costs with better accuracy and in greater detail
than is currently feasible,
NAVAIR has funded this project to collect the data and
develop an accurate and reliable way to estimate these cost
relationships. The key problems related to this research
will involve the data collection from the defense
contractors and the standardization of their data.
Representatives at NAS Patuxent River, Md., and Edwards Air
Force Base Flight Test Center have already stated that they
will assist in the collection of data at their
installations
.
C. AREA OF RESEARCH
Estimation of cost drivers in Aircraft System Test and
Evaluation (ASTE); conceptual modeling and some empirical
evidence. (Air Force, Navy, and civilian contractors
—
subject to data availability)
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1, What are the cost drivers in ASTE?
2. How do the characteristics and complexity of the
aircraft relate to the average engineering hour?
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3. What statistical and econometric models can be
appropriately applied to ASTE? Is multiple regression
appropriate to this problem?
4. Are the military work-breakdown structures pertinent to
ASTE?
5. How can a computer system (hardware and software) be
designed and implemented to conduct testing of the
models?
6. How have data been defined and collected in different
test sites (military and civilian)? Can they be
filtered, and standardized? What extrapolation method
should be used for missing data?
7. How do these cost drivers affect the average
engineering hour per hour of flight?
8. Is there any correlation between the number of
instrumentation channels and the number of engineering
hours?
9. Is there a linear cost relationship between different
types of aircraft with respect to their complexity and
characteristics?
10. How sensible and stable are the elasticities of the
cost drivers?
11. What are the implications of the findings?
12. Where is it most cost-effective to conduct future
military ASTE—at the contractors facilities or at the
established flight test centers? Is the answer the
same for both flight test centers?
13. Do the findings have an impact on the service's
operational test and evaluation?
14. How does inflation affect the predictive power of the
findings?
E. SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH
Develop essentially parametric cost estimating relationships
for selected system test and evaluation elements and each
appropriate functional cost category by:
1. Defining a sample of pertinent aircraft problems.
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2. Formulating a work break-down structure/functional cost
elements matrix.
3. Acquiring historical cost data,
4. Organizing the data for analysis.
5. Employing statistical methods to develop cost
estimating relationships.
6. Documenting data, sources, rationale, and methodology.
F. METHODOLOGY
This research seeks to apply microeconomic theory and cost
analysis in the area of Aircraft Systems Test and Evaluation
(ASTE). Multiple linear and logarithmic regression are
considered as analytical tools. This research also applies
the concepts defined in system analysis and design to
implement a decision support software for ASTE.
Interviews with defense contractors, Patuxent River Naval
Test Flight Center, Edwards Air Force Base Flight Test
Center, and on-site data collection are envisaged for the
first part of the research. Utilization of statistical
software packages to identify elasticities of cost drivers
will constitute the second part of the research.
I. BENEFITS OF STUDY
There is an increasing requirement from high levels that the
DOD ' s aircraft cost estimators/analysts provide explicit
estimates for the sub-elements of aircraft systems test and
evaluation efforts. This research project will attempt to
develop cost estimating relationships for test and
evaluation elements used for aircraft systems. The results
of this project will benefit DOD, Patuxent River Naval Test
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APPENDIX B: NAVAIR PROJECT POINTS OF CONTACT
Air Force Flight Test Center
Mrs. Carol Gutherie 805-227-3710
Code AC
Edwards Air Force Base, Ca. 93523
Boeing Aerospace Company





Mr. Len Chartier 213-593-0920
Cl-243 18A-40
3855 Lakewood Blvd.
Long Beach, Ca. 90846
Douglas Aircraft Company
Mr. Loren Frye 213-593-4745
Cl-240 41-80
3855 Lakewood Blvd.
Long Beach, Ca. 90846
Fairchild Republic Company









Mr. John Denheyer 817-777-1581
M/Z 1638
P.O. Box 748
Fort Worth, Tx. 76101
Grumman Aerospace Corporation





Mr. Bob Farmer 404-424-2741
Dept. 81-11, Zone 23
86 South Cobb Dr.
Marietta, Ga . 30063
Lockheed-California Company
Mr. Phil Finkle 818-847-3343
Dept. 81-16, B/66, P/A-1
P.O. Box 551
Burbank, Ca . 91520
LTV Aerospace and Defense
Aero Products Division





Mr. Raymond Yarck 314-234-7100
Dept. 015
P.O. Box 516
St. Louis, Mo. 63166
Naval Air Systems Command




Naval Air Test Center
Karen Tyson 301-863-3691
Business Resource Department
Antisubmarine Aircraft Test Directorate
Patuxent River, Md. 20670-5304
Rockwell International Corporation
Mr. Gayle Turner 614-239-2796
Bldg. 3
4300 E. Fifth Ave.
Columbus, Oh. 43216
Rockwell International Corporation
Mr. George Bostater 213-414-4819
Dept 196, 011-ZR09
P.O. Box 90098
Los Angeles, Ca. 90009
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We would like to thank you again for the opportunity we had
to meet with you and visit your facilities to discuss our
research project last month. Your inputs were extremely valuable
in giving us an overview of 's methods used for the cost
estimation of aircraft systems and your test and evaluation
cprograms. At that time, we promised to clarify our data
collection requirements following a meeting with our Naval Air
Systems Command (NAVAIR) project sponsor on 20-21 November. The
information you provided was discussed and helped focus the scope
of our project and the specific areas of data required for our
research.
The scope of this project will initially include only the
following areas of aircraft system test and evaluation:
Contractor Flight Test
Wind Tunnel and Article Test
Static Article and Test
Fatigue Article and Test.
In our initial letter, we provided a matrix of Work Breakdown
Structure (WES) sub-elements in these areas and a listing of the









The basic System Test and Evaluation data required for our
project are direct labor hours and dollar values for the
aircraft system(s) your facility produced, broken down into the
sub-element matrix, and also listed in a time-phased fashion.
In order to normalize this information between contractors,
it is important that we know your specific definition of the WBS
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sub-elements used by your company for direct labor hour tracking.
For the direct labor hours, we request that you provide a brief
description of how the engineering, manufacturing, tooling,
quality control and support hour categories were derived if your
records differ from the Contractor Cost Data Reporting methods.
For the aircraft flight test portion of our research, we
request the number of aircraft used in your flight test program
with associated flight hours.
We request the data for direct labor hour/dollar categories
and the flight test hours be expressed in a time-phased fashion.
If this data is not available from your records time-phased,
please estimate the start and completion dates and indicate the
peak activity levels within the test period.
A cost driver indicated for the flight test program was the
total number of separate tests to be conducted during the flight
phase. If you have information available to indicate the total
number of separate tests and a brief description of these test
categories, it will help in the quality of our final product.
We feel that this research can be valuable to our military
project sponsor and also useful to as a cost
estimating tool. The accuracy of our final product will depend
primarily on the data we receive from your company and our
ability to correlate it with the data from the other contractors
we have visited.
We realize the constraints of your busy schedule, but would
appreciate to be able to receive as much of this data as possible
by January 10, 1987 to be used in a meeting which will be held
with the NAVAIR project sponsor January 15, 16 and 17,
We again express our thanks for the assistance that you have
provided and your continued interest in our program. We will
call you next week and attempt to answer questions that you may
have concerning this data format or limitations that may be
peculiar to a specific aircraft system.
Sincerely,
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FLIGHT TEST AND DEMONSTRATION
FLIGHT TEST SUPPORT
FLIGHT TEST SPARES & REPAIR PARTS
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
CONTRACTOR TECHNICAL/MAINTENANCE SERVICES
WIND TUNNEL ARTICLE & TEST
WIND TUNNEL ARTICLE
WIND TUNNEL TEST
STATIC ARTICLE & TEST
STATIC ARTICLE
STATIC TEST





1. # of flight test a/c and first flight of each.
2. Flight hours ( time phased)
3. Wind tunnel occupancy hours ( time phased)
4. Type of wind tunnel test
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